The freight industry involves moving goods, e.g., bulk, liquid, containers, and the like, between destinations using a variety of transportation modes. Over the years, the industry has evolved to the point whereby the vast majority of the shipments today generally involves four major participants: 1) the carrier who operates the transportation equipment, 2) the shipper who tends to be the producer of the goods to be shipped, 3) the forwarder who aggregate goods from shippers to more efficiently employ the capacity offered by the carriers between destination points, and 4) market makers who derive profit from trading in shipping contracts but improve liquidity in the freight market as a byproduct of their participation.
The multi-modal freight industry. Shipment between any two destinations may involve multiple transportation modes and multiple possible routings. To facilitate discussion, FIG. 1A shows some hypothetical shippers, forwarders, and carriers involved in shipping between Hong Kong (HKG) and Reno, Nev. (Reno). In this example, shipper 102 and shipper 104 may employ trucks to transport the goods to the forwarder 106 in Hong Kong to be shipped to a receiving entity in Reno. Depending on the nature of the goods to be shipped, the transportation requirements specified by the shippers, and other factors, forwarder 106 generally tries to look for the lowest cost shipment method that can fulfill the shipping orders.
For example, forwarder 106 may choose to route the goods via Alaska by air (108) to arrive at a warehouse at the San Francisco Airport (SFO). From SFO, the goods may be transported by air (110) to Reno, or may be sent by truck (112a and 112b) to Reno via Sacramento (SAC). Forwarder 106 may also choose to ship by sea (114) to the Oakland port (OAK). From OAK, the goods may be shipped via truck (116 and 112b) to Reno via Sacramento (SAC). Alternatively, forwarder 106 may choose to ship by air (118) to Los Angeles (LAX). From LAX, the goods may be shipped via truck (120 and 112b) to Reno via Sacramento (SAC) or via air (122) directly to Reno. As can be appreciated from FIG. 1A, freight shipment involves a multiplicity of modes (e.g., sea, air, or truck) and routes.
Long-term contracts and spot market purchases. Generally speaking, the relationships among shippers, forwarders, and carriers are historically governed by two mechanisms: spot market purchase and long-term contract. To facilitate discussion, FIG. 1B shows that the relationship between forwarder 130 and carrier 132, which is governed by spot market purchase 136 and long-term contract 134. Forwarder 130 may wish to enter into a long term contract 134 with a carrier 132 in order to lock in the price and to assure capacity at a future date. Likewise, carrier 132 may wish to lock in the price and to ensure that the capacity will be sold in advance to minimize the risk of underutilization. An example long-term contract may be an agreement to purchase 30 tons of shipping for $3.00 per ton on a ship leaving from Hong Kong to OAK 6 months from the date the long-term contract is signed.
A spot market purchase represents a purchase by forwarder 130 of the capacity needed to ship goods in the immediate near future. An example spot purchase may be a purchase of shipping capacity of 20 tons on a ship leaving in two days from Hong Kong to OAK. The time frame between the time a spot market purchase is made and the time the goods is transported may be as little as a few hours to allow for loading, or may be as long as a week or longer, depending on the custom of the particular industry segment concerned. In making a spot market purchase, the forwarder 130 must typically pay what the market would bear at the time.
Capacity and Pricing Risks. The decision regarding which mode(s) and route(s) to employ for a particular shipment of goods is a complex one, involving factors such as the maximum permissible time en-route, the price paid by the shipper, and the availability of shipping capacity from the carriers (which itself is complex and may involve other factors such as the nature of the goods shipped, weather, fuel cost, labor availability, etc.). Likewise, the decision regarding whether to employ a long-term contract, a spot-market purchase, or a combination thereof to fulfill a shipping order is a complex one, involving a multitude of factors. These factors change all the times, thereby continually introducing pricing and capacity risks for shippers, forwarders, and carriers.
For shippers, an overriding concern is the ability to ship goods in a timely manner. Some shipper cannot tolerate capacity starvation, which is a condition characterized by an insufficient capacity to ship the goods in a timely manner. To minimize such risks, a shipper would enter into long-term contracts with forwarders or carriers to ensure that the capacity is guaranteed for certain critical shipments at future dates.
Another risk is overpurchasing, which may occur when the shipper buys more capacity under a long-term contract than required at shipment time. To mitigate the overpurchasing risk, the shipper may purchase less than the required capacity under long-term contracts, and may make up the difference using spot-market purchases.
Both long-term contracts and spot-market purchases involve pricing risks. For example, at the time of shipping, the spot-market price may be much higher than the long-term contract price, making the spot-market purchase extremely costly for the buyer (e.g., the forwarder if capacity starvation is to be addressed via spot market purchases). Conversely, the spot-market price may be much lower than the long-term contract price. In this situation, it may be said that the buyer overpaid in exchange for a lower risk of capacity starvation.
Forwarders of course would like to maximize profits by buying shipping capacity from carriers at the lowest cost possible and selling capacity to shippers at a highest price that can be obtained. If a forwarder miscalculates and purchases too little capacity from carriers, that forwarder risks defaulting on existing long-term contracts with shippers. In this case, the forwarder must purchase capacity on the spot market to make up the difference at shipment time. Again, at the time of shipping, the spot-market price may be much higher than the long-term contract price with the shipper, lowering or eliminating any profit for the forwarder. Conversely, the spot-market price may be much lower than the long-term contract price with the shipper. In this situation, the forwarder benefits since it can fulfill the existing long-term contracts with shippers using capacity bought at a much lower spot-market price.
The same considerations exist in the relationship between a forwarder and the carriers. If a forwarder miscalculates and purchases too little capacity from carriers, that forwarder risks defaulting on existing long-term contracts with shippers. In this case, the forwarder must purchase capacity on the spot market to make up the difference at shipment time. Again, at the time of shipping, the spot-market price may be much higher than the long-term contract price with the shipper, lowering or eliminating any profit for the forwarder. Conversely, the spot-market price may be much lower than the long-term contract price with the shipper. In this situation, the forwarder benefits since it can fulfill the contract with capacity bought at a much lower spot-market price.
Carriers have fixed assets and perishable products in the form of transportation means (e.g., planes, trains, trucks, ships) that must leave on time irrespective whether the capacity is sold. Accordingly, a carrier is typically highly concerned with selling all of its the available capacity before the time of departure. While long-term contracts with forwarders guarantee that the capacity will be sold, the use of long-term contracts may lower a carrier's potential profit. This is because the profit margin per shipping unit on a long-term contract is typically (but not always) lower than the profit margin obtainable when sold on the spot market.
A carrier's potential profit may be lowered through factors that are not in their control. For example, war, changes in fuel pricing, changes in tourism patterns (which affect the number of airplanes flying between two destinations, for example), labor strikes, etc., may affect the overall availability of capacity, causing fluctuations in the spot-market pricing. If, at the time of shipping, the spot-market price is much higher than the long-term contract price with the forwarder, every ton shipped under a long-term contract instead of pursuant to a spot-market purchase lowers the profit that the carrier could have obtained. Conversely, the spot-market price may be much lower than the long-term contract price with the forwarder. If the carrier did not fill the transport with long-term contract goods, the carrier will need to sell the remaining capacity on the spot market, in effect carrying some of the goods at a lower price than the carrier could have charged under a long-term contract.
FIGS. 1C and 1D illustrate these concepts of pricing risk and capacity risk. As shown in FIG. 1C, if the forwarder guesses incorrectly and the price is $2.00 per ton on the spot market at the time of performance T1 of FIG. 1C, the forwarder in effect overpaid by $1.00 per ton for the capacity employed. On the other hand, if the price is $5.00 per ton on the spot market at the time of performance T1, the carrier would have “lost” $2.00 per ton of potential profit for every ton of shipping performed under a long-term contract instead of under a spot market order.
With regard to capacity risks, if the forwarder fails to secure enough capacity via long-term contracts as shown in the example of FIG. 1D, the forwarder may be forced to purchase the remaining required capacity on the spot market if possible. In some cases, there is capacity on the spot market but such capacity, when bought on a short notice, may be extremely expensive. In other cases, there may be no capacity at any price.
Unequal access to information. Although the participants all have risks, each participant has a different degree and type of risk. This is partly due to the fact that the type and quality of information available to each participant is different.
Consider the factors that influence the decision making process of shippers and forwarders with regard to freight shipment. Forwarders and shippers base their freight shipping decisions (e.g., long-term contracts versus spot contracts, price, volume, etc.) partly on their best guesses regarding the aggregated demand from all shippers as well as the aggregated shipping capacity at shipping time.
If the aggregate shipping volume from shippers is high at shipping time, the spot market price would also tend to be high as shippers and forwarders compete for the available shipping capacity. The aggregated demand from shippers may depend on factors such as the consumer demand for goods, inventory level at retailers, etc. With respect to current and forecasted shipping volume, shippers tend to have the most information, followed by forwarders and then carriers. Line 180 on the plot of FIG. 1E illustrates the distribution of shipping volume information among the shipper, the forwarder, and the carrier. Since carrier 174 owns fixed, perishable assets in the form of departing transports, the carrier bears the highest risk for incorrectly forecasting the shipping volume. This is shown by line 182 of FIG. 1E.
The available capacity from the carriers must also be taken into consideration. Factors such as weather, war, labor strikes, fuel cost, tourism patterns, etc. all determine the shipping capacity available at any given point in time. Carrier 174 naturally has a deeper understanding of their own capacity and capacity trends over time and consequently has an edge over forwarder 172 and shipper 170 in determining the current capacity and forecasting the future capacity. This is shown by line 184 of FIG. BE. Since shipper 170 is at the highest risk if there is insufficient capacity to ship the goods when needed (e.g., capacity starvation), the highest capacity-related risk is borne by shipper 170. This is shown by line 186 of FIG. 1E.
Some known approaches. Attempts have been made to streamline the process of matching buyers and sellers in the freight industry. Instead of leaving shippers, forwarders, and carriers to negotiate long-term contracts and conduct spot purchases directly with one another, electronic exchanges have been created. Using modern computers and a world-wide network such as the Internet, sellers can post available capacity and buyers can post orders for viewing. Tools are also available to match up orders and capacity based on the terms posted so that the buyers and sellers can efficiently find one another.
FIG. 2 shows a prior art electronic exchange 202 for facilitating commerce between carrier 204, forwarder 206, and shipper 208. Via electronic exchange 202, carrier 204 can post future capacity and a limit price 210 (e.g., 300 tons of capacity from Hong Kong to Oakland, available on Jun. 10, 2004 at no less than $1.50 per ton). This post may be utilized by forwarder 206 or shipper 208 to satisfy their shipping requirements. Forwarder 206 may likewise post either the available capacity (and desired price) 212 that it has purchased earlier or the required capacity (and maximum price) 214 that it wishes to purchase. Shipper 208 may likewise employ electronic exchange 202 to post shipping order and limit price 216 (e.g., 10 tons from Hong Kong to Oakland on Jun. 10, 2004 at no more than $1.60 per ton). Employing a matching algorithm, electronic exchange 202 may then match up buyers (e.g., shippers or forwarders) with sellers (e.g., carriers or forwarders). The matches are forwarded by the respective parties via arrows 232, 234, and 236 as shown.
In addition to facilitating direct purchases of capacity between buyers and sellers (known as forward contract transactions), electronic transaction system may also facilitate the trading of futures in capacity between specific destinations. A futures contract, as is well known in the commodity industry, is a contract entered into between two parties, to specify the contractual terms to be performed at a specified point in time in the future. A futures contract in bulk freight may specify, for example, 100 tons of bulk shipping from Hong Kong to Oakland leaving on Jul. 1, 2004 at $1.80 per ton. In this sense, capacity futures are treated in the same manner as well-known futures in coffee, pork, sugar, etc. Further, just like their counterparts in the agricultural futures market, individuals in the capacity futures market can employ futures contracts to speculate and profit on trades pertaining to freight shipments between specific destinations. A variation of futures trading is index trading in which an index (or weighted average or mean between high and low prices) of transaction prices is calculated in real-time. Trader can in essence, bet on future values of the index, the gains or losses being proportional to the difference between the value estimated by the trader (the strike) and the actual value at the pre-agreed date. Index futures are cash settled and are routinely used in the financial industry to manage risks.
Although prior art electronic exchange 202 is useful for matching up buyers and sellers, there are shortcomings. Existing prior art electronic exchange systems have been uni-modal, i.e., limited to ocean shipping of bulk goods. Two such electronic exchanges are known to the inventors: Imarex (www.Imarex.com) and Baltic Exchange (www.balticexchange.com). This type of prior art electronic exchange is not well-suited to handle shipping between destinations that can be served by multiple shipping modes (e.g., sea, truck, train, or air) and/or destinations that may be routed through different intermediate shipping points (e.g., Alaska, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Oakland, Sacramento in the aforementioned example of FIG. 1A).
Further, participants in such electronic exchanges still suffer from the aforementioned uneven distribution of information. For example, carriers still suffer from a lack of reliable information regarding shipping volume and shippers still do not have reliable information regarding capacity even though their published orders can be matched more readily via the prior art electronic exchange system. This lack of reliable information also affects the ability of speculative futures traders (referred to herein as market makers) to intelligently evaluate trades in capacity futures, causing some traders to shy away from participating fully or at all in the capacity futures market. In turn, liquidity suffers.
The inherent inefficiency in the freight market has created opportunities for electronic capacity aggregators. As understood by the inventors, an electronic capacity aggregator such as one attempted by the now-defunct Enron Corporation of Houston, Tex., attempts to create scarcity by buying up a high percentage of the trucking capacity between two destinations (e.g., between Austin, Tex. and San Jose, Calif.). The capacity is purchased via future contracts from carriers, which the electronic capacity aggregator then attempts to resell to forwarders (and perhaps even shippers) at a profit.
By exerting a high degree of market control, i.e., over the trucking capacity available, such electronic clearinghouses can minimize pricing risk to themselves. In other words, by consolidating most of the trucking capacity between two destinations under their control, an electronic clearinghouse has almost perfect information regarding the shipping capacity available between two destination points and can create artificial scarcity and maximize profit by controlling the release of this now scarce commodity to forwarders and shippers.
Again, this model has limited applications and does nothing to address the information disparity among the existing participants or the multi-modal nature of the freight industry. Although some may argue that the use of an electronic clearinghouse provides open pricing information to participants so they can be aware of how much capacity would cost for any particular route for any particular date, it may also be argued that such clearinghouse arrangement increases the risk of abuse if the clearinghouse succeeds in completely or nearly completely control shipping capacity between any two destination points.